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Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2002) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
ERNESTO HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF 
OF THE APPELLANT 
CaseNo.20020576-CA 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT MR. HERNANDEZ WAS GUILTY OF DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL WITH A PASSENGER UNDER THE AGE 
OF SIXTEEN YEARS IN THE VEHICLE RATHER THAN THE CRIME 
OF RECKLESS DRIVING. 
In his opening brief Mr. Hernandez documented the appropriate rules 
of statutory construction. The plain language contained within a statute is 
to be interpreted as the intent of the statute unless an ambiguity exists within 
the language. See Brief of Appellant, pages 10-13. 
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will 
not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are 
guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed 
according to its plain language. ... When language is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room 
is left for construction. 
Brendlev. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
The Reckless Driving statute reads: 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. 
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle: 
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property; 
or 
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under 
Title 41
 y Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts 
within a single continuous period of driving. 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added). Mr. Hernandez insists 
that the language in 41-6-45(l)(b) is so plain on its face that any and all 
moving traffic violations as pronounced by the legislature in Title 41, 
Chapter 6 are expressly adopted as potential elements of the (l)(b) violation 
if committed in a series of violations with two or more others. The State 
says that the DUI statute is somehow exempted from this plain reading of 
the statute despite conceding that DUI is a moving traffic violation that falls 
under Title 41, Chapter 6, of the Traffic Rules and Regulations section of the 
code. Brief of Appellee at P. 10, text and n. 1. 
In short, the State disagrees with the plain meaning encouraged by 
Mr. Hernandez because it does not like the result. For example, the State 
does not cite to any specific language within the statute which is somehow 
or in someway ambiguous. Each of the result-oriented interpretations by 
the State requires this court to reach beyond the plain language of the 
legislature and contort a different meaning. None of the interpretations of 
the State are justified first, because the language is unambiguous thereby 
forbidding any new construction of the plain language; and second, the State 
fails to provide any extended analysis, historic or otherwise, which supports 
its position other than to impermissibly rewrite the statute and claim disdain 
for the result. The statute does not require to be read in conjunction with 
the DUI statute; the DUI statute is now an included part of the statute 
provided the other two requisite violations are present as well. 
The State says, "The defendant fails to explain how eliminating 
prosecutions under Utah's DUI statutes would achieve securing the public's 
safety." Brief of Appellee at 11. Neither Mr. Hernandez nor this Court is 
required to address this contention of the state. The legislature wrote the 
statute; if the plain meaning of the statute is something other than that which 
is desired, then the legislature can rewrite the statute as is their prerogative. 
As discussed in Mr. Hernandez' opening brief, our Utah Supreme Court has 
addressed this very issue in a Shondel analysis in 1985. There the Court 
stated: 
This Court does not declare statutes unenforceable or unconstitutional 
because they could have been better drafted; indeed it has long been 
the law that we attempt to construe statutes to be constitutional. Nor 
are we concerned with legislative policy decisions embodied in 
statutes. Nevertheless, we cannot disregard our responsibility to 
assure the rational and evenhanded application of the criminal laws. 
Equal protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all those who 
are similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written 
so that there are significant differences between offenses and so that 
the exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties depending 
under which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge. 
That would be a form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of 
law. The Legislature may make automobile homicide committed 
recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony, but it cannot make the 
crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the choice to the 
prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony or a misdemeanor. 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (citations omitted). See extended 
argument in Brief of Appellant at 15-16. 
This Court should resist the result-oriented interpretations provided by 
the State to affirm the trial court's erroneous decision, undoubtedly equally 
motivated by the same desire to read a contrary result into an otherwise 
clearly articulated statute. This Court should reverse and remand the 
Hernandez matter to the lower court to enter a sentence on the Reckless 
Driving violation as clearly indicated in the statute. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE 
SHONDEL LINE OF CASES DID NOT REQUIRE THAT MR. 
HERNANDEZ' CONVICTION BE ENTERED FOR THE LESSER 
PUNISHED CRIME OF RECKLESS DRIVING. 
The State of Utah claims that Shondel does not apply because the 
traffic offenses of Reckless Driving and DUI have different elements. A 
review of both statutes prior to the 2000 amendment would likely support 
d 
the claim of the state. However, this claim inarguably fails when applied to 
the current language of § 41-6-45(l)(b). The statute now reads as follows: 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. 
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle: 
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property; 
or 
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under 
Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts 
within a single continuous period of driving. 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added). In section (l)(b) the 
legislature has expressly made each and every moving violation in Title 41, 
Chapter 6, as a crime and an element of reckless driving.1 Once any three of 
those offenses are established then the three offenses merge together to 
create a reckless driving charge. As indicated above, DUI is not exempted 
from this statute. The States argument refuses to recognize that the DUI 
statute, in its entirety, is an included offense just as are all other traffic 
offenses from Title 41, Chapter 6. Their position to the contrary is without 
merit. Because DUI, on the facts of this case, is an element of the new 
reckless driving offense of subsection (l)(b), Shondel most certainly applies 
and the lower punishment of a B misdemeanor necessarily applies. 
1
 The State of Utah concedes that DUI is a moving traffic violation within 41-6. 
Brief of Appellee at 10. 
* 
POINT III. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State incredulously states that oral argument would not 
significantly aid the Court in deciding the case. Mr. Hernandez disagrees. 
Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure delineates that "oral 
argument will be allowed in all cases unless the court concludes: the appeal 
is frivolous, the issue has recently been authoritatively decided, or that the 
decisional process would not be significantly aided by the oral argument. 
This issue has been determined to not be frivolous as indicated by the court's 
decision to withdraw its motion for summary disposition after filing of Mr. 
Hernandez' objection to that process. This newly amended Reckless 
Driving statute has not yet been reviewed by the Court. Oral argument can 
help to clarify the positions of the parties that are only briefly provided to 
the court in these pleadings. Mr. Hernandez respectfully requests the 
opportunity to address the Court and believes oral argument unquestionably 
will aide the decisional process. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Ernesto Hernandez respectfully requests that this Court to 
review the statutory construction issues and supporting Shondel argument 
presented herein, and for all or any of the reasons stated, to correct the 
decision of the trial court and reverse the conviction for Driving Under the 
Influence and remand the matter for a new sentencing for the corrected 
offense of Reckless Driving. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7^_ day of April, 2003. 
BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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